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Any discussion of future interests in chattels personal may
well begin with the admirable treatment of the subject by Pro-
fessor John Chipman Gray in his treatise on the Ru/b Against
Perpetuit.' He first traced the history of the development
of future interests in chattels real in English law, showing that
a gift of a chattel real for life was once thought of as passing the
absolute interest because of the technical doctrine that a life
estate is greater than a term of years; that at an early period
it was held to be possible to devise a term of years to A for life
and on his death to B, on the theory that A had the whole estate
subject to an executory devise in B; but that, so far as inter
vivos transfers were concerned, the English law never recog-
nized that there could be a valid gift over after a life estate in
a term. He then showed that at first there could be no gift of
a chattel other than an absolute one; he quotes from Brooke's
Abridgement, "gift or devise of a chattel for an hour is for-
ever." 2 We are told, however, that it was possible to give the
use of a chattel by way of bailment, and that it came to be recog-
nized that one could give the use of a chattel for life. A further
step was reached when the courts held that if a chattel personal
be bequeathed to A for life, with remainder to B, A would be
regarded as having a life use with the general property in B.
This last Professor Gray regarded as the better theory, pointing
out, as does also Professor Holdsworth,3 that it is one of three
possible theories as to the nature of a gift over after a life in-
terest in a chattel personal.
' GRAY, RULE AGAINST PMPUMTUITIES (3d ed. 1915) §§ 71-97, 789-850.
2 BROOKE, Awa. (1576) Done et Remainder, p1. 57, Devise, pl. 13. The
latter is quoted in GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 66 and 598.
3 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1926) 475, 476.
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These three theories are as follows: (1) if a chattel personal
is bequeathed to A for life and on his death to B, A may be
thought of as having a legal use or possession, and B as having
a legal interest in the nature of a vested remainder; (2) A may
be regarded as having an absolute legal interest subject to an
executory limitation in B, valid at law; (3) A may have the
whole legal interest in trust for himself for life and then in trust
for B. Professor Gray discards the third theory as historically
unsound and as unsupported by the cases. He devotes consider-
able space to a consideration of the merits of the first two
theories, the second of which he concedes is approved by most
of the English text writers. He explains this by suggesting
that it is due to an unwarranted application of the theory of
future interests in chattels real to chattels personal. Because
a life estate is regarded as greater than any term of years is no
reason why a man will live "longer than a picture or table will
last." He supports the first view, not only by the historical
argument already outlined, but by contending that in the two
cases where it would make a difference in result the authorities
are in accord with the first rather than the second theory.4
4 Professor Gray summarizes these two points thus: "Suppose a chattel
personal is bequeathed to an unborn person for life, and on his death to
A.' and his executors. If the gift to A. is vested (according to the old
theory), then it is not too remote; if the gift to A. is executory, then it
is void for remoteness. All the authorities, American and English, hold
that the gift to A. is not too remote.
"Suppose a chattel personal is given to A. for life, with no limitation
over. Then, on the old theory, upon A's death there is a reversion to
the donor or his executors. On the modern English theory A. takes the
whole property in the chattel, and there being no limitation over, it should
go on A's death to his executors. There is no English authority directly
on the point. The weight of American authority is in favor of the re-
version." GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 610-611.
As to the first point, as is subsequently pointed out, we should not infer
from this holding that the future interest after a life interest in a chattel
personal is like a remainder in land in other respects merely because it
resembles it in the applicability of the rule against perpetuities. Indeed,.
Professor Gray seems to recognize this to some extent when he refers to
the interest as a quasi-remainder.
As to Professor Gray's argument about a gift of a chattel personal to,
A for life, with no gift over, his inference may be open to question. Even
if a life estate in a chattel were considered as a gift of the chattel,
there might still be some sort of a reversionary interest in the donor, if
we follow the analogy of the land law. If A, owning in fee simple abso-
lute, conveys Blackacre to B and his heirs, so long as a certain oak tree
stands, it is the general view today that B gets a determinable fee, and A
still has a possibility of reverter. Powell, Determinable Fees (1923) 23
COL. L. Rav. 207. Yet the feudal notion was that A had conveyed a type.
of estate as great in quantum as he had. Just so, though a life interest
in a chattel is regarded as of the same type in quantum as a gift to A,
his executors, administrators, and assigns, yet it may be treated like a de--
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From an historical standpoint, Professor Gray's treatment is
scarcely open to criticism. But history alone cannot solve the
problems now confronting the courts with respect to future
interests in chattels personal. The gaps in the historical picture
are too many; the cases in point are too few; the social interests
contending for supremacy when they were decided were too
insignificant to justify us in going far toward piecing out the
law of future interests in chattels personal from historical
materials. As Professor Holdsworth tells us: "The paucity
of authority, and the obscurity of the rules, upon this question
of the creation of successive interests in chattels personal, show
that the whole topic is and has been a little explored backvater
of the law." 5
The principal critical observation which may be made concern-
ing Professor Gray's discussion, aside from his emphasis of
historical materials, would appear to the writer to be this:
There is too much tendency to assume that future interests in
chattels can be discussed in terms of feudal concepts, that they
are either executory limitations or remainders or reversions
with most of the legal implications of those terms when applied
to land. Would it not be more useful to consider the rights,
privileges, powers, and other legal relations incident to these
situations, rather than to apply in toto a concept from another
field of law which resembles in one or two particulars a future
interest in personalty? Merely because a present or future
interest in personalty is like a life estate or remainder in land
as to duration of the privilege of enjoyment or as to its validity
terminable interest, a sort of "fee simple" in the chattel with a special
limitation. Thus, if we follow the terminology of the land law, the grantor
would have a possibility of reverter, not a reversion. Of course Professor
Gray would not have made that explanation because he took the position
that there could be no such thing as a determinable fee or a possibility
of reverter in land. And so he explains the English case of Eyres v.
Faulkland, 1 Salk. 231 (1697), a decision recognizing a reversionary in-
terest after life interests in a chattel real, as an authority for the propo-
sition that a gift over after a life estate in a chattel is not like an execu-
tory limitation. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 597.
The court's meaning in this case is so plain as to make it worth while
to quote from the report. It reads: "As to the principal case, they held
that all the remainders were good; . . . for there may be possibility
of reverter, even where no remainder can be limited, as the case of a gift
to A and his heirs while such a tree stands: no remainder can be limited
over, and yet clearly the donor has a possibility of reverter, though no
actual reversion; a fortiori, there shall be a possibility of reverter, where
a remainder may be limited over; for the testator gave but a limited estate,
and what he has not given away must remain in him; and the words for
life can be no more rejected in the last limitation than in the first." Eyres
v. Faulkland, supra at 231.
5 7 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 477.
6 Supra note 4.
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under the rule against perpetuities may not prove that the other
legal consequences which attach to life estates and remainders
in land are present.7
It is the purpose of this paper to inquire to what extent the
rules of the law of estates and future interests in land are useful
in solving questions relative to future interests in chattels
personal. Incidentally some conclusions may be suggested as
to the most desirable approach to problems concerning future
interests in personalty. The question is considered from the
standpoint of the various legal relations involved. Any dis-
cussion of the subject of consumable chattels is omitted from
this paper. While brief reference is made to the questions of
the acceleration of future interests in chattels, and the distinc-
tion between vested and contingent interests in chattels, a
complete treatment of these subjects is beyond the scope of this
discussion.
Before proceeding with a comparative analysis of the legal
relations involved in future interests in land and personalty,
it is desirable to make six observations which should be kept
in mind in the succeeding discussion.
(1) Land law is concerned with a subject matter which
differs materially from the subject matter of the law of chattels.
Land is readily identifiable, fixed, immovable, indestructible;
but chattels may be lost, disguised, consumed, or carried away.
These differences are bound to be reflected to some degree in
the law. Moreover, the objects included within the term
chattels personal vary greatly from each other. Within that
category we sometimes include stocks, bonds, and other intan-
gibles, as well as heirlooms, money, and consumables.
(2) In spite of these inherent differences between land and
chattels, one can discern a tendency in modern law to bring the
law of chattels and of land more nearly together. This is
doubtless due as much to changes in the land law as in the law
of chattels. Feudal rules are being lopped off from the land
law; statutes of descent and distribution tend more and more to
distribute personalty and realty to the same persons. In
England they are also distributed substantially in the same
way., Indeed one of the objects of the English Law of Property
Act of 1925 was to assimilate the law of land and chattels in so
7 It is not contended that Professor Gray ignored specific legal conse-
quences. Two of these are made the basis of his argument, referred to
supra note 4. There is, however, a tendency to assume that some type of
future interest recognized in the land law should be the basis of the rules
as to chattels.
8 That is, both go to the personal representative on the owner's decease.
See Land Transfer Act, 60 & 61 VICT. c. 65, § 1 (1897); and Administra-
tion of Estates Act, 15 Gno. V, c. 23, § 1 (1) (1925).
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far as possible., Whereas in feudal times holdings of personalty
were comparatively insignificant,2° at the present time they fre-
quently make up, at least if we include intangibles, a large part
of a decedent's estate, and represent enormous wealth. More-
over, it is not uncommon in modern wills for land and person-
ally to be lumped together in one mass frequently by a residuary
clause and to be distributed by a single set of dispositive pro-
visions covering both kinds of property. Naturally, if such
testamentary provisions are to be dealt with often, identities in
the law of land and of chattels would simplify matters.
(3) We should not be misled by numerous dicta and argu-
ments of American courts of last resort in which the applica-
bility of the English law of estates and future interests in
chattels is assumed. A few illustrations will suffice to explain
what is meant by this observation. In the well-known case of
Smith v. Bell,1 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall observed that "The
rule that a remainder may be limited, after a life estate in
personal property, is as well settled as any other principle in
our law." What the case really holds is that where negro
slaves were bequeathed for life, with a gift over to another after
the death of the first taker, an assignee of the donee of the gift
over could recover in trover against the husband of the one
having the life interest after the latter's decease. That the
future interest in question resembled a remainder in land as to
the privilege of enjoyment would appear to be the extent of
the actual decision on this point.
In Polluxk v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co.12 the question at issue was
whether or not certain future interests in personalty should
have been scheduled by the holder thereof in a petition in
voluntary bankruptcy in order to secure his dicharge. The
court regarded the case as turning in part at least on whether
or not the interest in question was "vested" or "contingent."
In the opinion of Smith, Circuit Judge, he says: "Some con-
fusion exists from the attempt to apply legal terms having their
primary application to real estate to personal properly." He
then quotes Smith on Persowml Property to the effect that,
"Contrary to the ancient common law doctrine, it is now well
established that there may be an interest in expectancy in
personal property." He also quotes from a case which cited
Fearne's well known definition of a contingent remainder in
land. Judge Trieber, in his concurring opinion, quotes Fearne
on Contingent Remaiders at some length, applying statements
9 UNDERHILL, THE NEw CONVEYANCING (1925) 7.
lo See Wn.IAm, REAL PPommRY (21st ed. 1910) 10.
116 Pet. 68 (U. S. 1832).
12 233 Fed. 861 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).
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made by that author with respect to the distinction between
vested and contingent remainders in land to future interests
in personalty. The only thing decided in the case, however,
is that the future interests in question should have been
scheduled.
In Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of Art 23 the court said:
"At common law an interest in personal property by way of
remainder may be limited after a life estate in such property."
The court then laid down the proposition that contingent
remainders with a double aspect could be created, and cited in
support a passage from Fearne dealing exclusively with land,
and the leading English case of Loddington v. Kime 14 which
recognizes contingent remainders in the alternative in land.
The opinion does not refer to the fact that these authorities deal
with interests in land, apparently assuming that the same rule
applies to both types of property. The point about which these
statements were made, however, was merely whether or not as
a matter of construction a certain provision in a bequest of
chattels was to be treated as a condition precedent rather than
as a condition subsequent.
In Innes v. Potter I the court said:
"The doctrine that personal property may be limited by way
of remainder after a life interest created at the same time was
early recognized in the United States [citing authorities]. The
disposition of the later cases has been to dispense with all
fictitious distinctions between the transfers of real and personal
property, and to apply the same rules to both, except where
distinctions are founded upon some substantial principle of law
or are required by some statutory enactment."
Other statements of similar import may be found in some of
the cases involving future interests in slaves to which further
reference will be subsequently made.
(4) There are certain recognized historical differences be-
tween the law of realty and the law of personalty which are
still important in our legal system. The Statute of Uses was
inapplicable to chattels. The same is true of the Statute De
Donis, so that fee tail estates in chattels were obviously impos-
sible. On the decease of the owner, land passed to the heir or
devisee, while chattels passed to the administrator or executor.
A sharp distinction exists between freehold and non-freehold
interests in land, although the same distinction was never drawn
as to interests in chattels. While it is not of much significance
3 298 Fed. 894 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
24 1 Salk. 224 (1695).
15 130 Minn. 320, 153 N. W. 604 (1915).
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today, it may also be added that the notion of feudal tenure was
not applied to chattels personal.O
(5) American cases involving future interests in slaves
should not be given the same force and effect as precedents as
is accorded to adjudications relative to interests in other kinds
of chattels.
A brief consideration of the slave cases as a group may be
pertinent to this discussion. Slaves were said to be personalty,
but the early decisions disclose that they were much more closely
connected with interests in land than most other chattels."7 By
statute in Virginia and Kentucky it was possible to annex slaves
to land and give them in tail."' In Louisiana a statutory pro-
vision declared slaves to be immovables.10 In a Virginia case :3
decided in colonial days we find the question presented to the
court whether slaves could be entailed without being annexed to
land. Counsel is reported to have made the significant observa-
tion that "The legislature, considering the intimacy of connection
between slaves and lands, and that the latter in this country
could be of but little profit without the former, thought it
expedient to declare them real estate." The majority of the
court were of opinion that slaves unattached to land could not
be entailed, but the case indicates that attempts to create such
an estate were common. Indeed, one case in Jefferson's Virginia
reports would seem to indicate that the court thought slaves
were subject to the Statute of Uses.21
Nevertheless, the courts fully recognized that slaves were
essentially chattels. In Kentucky, in spite of an act which de-
clared slaves to be real estate, the court held that the law of the
domicile of the owner, and not of the situs of the property,
applied where slaves in Kentucky were owned by a person in
16 It should be observed, however, that the notion of tenure and the notion
of estates are not identical. See 2 HOLDSWORT11, op. cit. supra noto 3, at
349-352. Hence, while we may discard any rule incident to feudal tenure
when dealing with chattels, we do not necessarily discard the doctrine of
estates on that account.
17 See, for example, the observation of the court in Beadle v. Hunter, 3
Strob. 331, 336 (S. C. 1848), where, after indicating that the rule as to
tacking successive adverse possessions should be the same in the case of
slaves and of land, the court said: "Indeed every day's experience satis-
fies- me, that land and slaves should be placed upon the same footing, in
every respect."
18 Cf. Blackwell v. Wilkinson, Jeff. 73 (Va. 1768) ; Dade v. Alexander, 1
Wash. 30 (Va. 1791); McNair v. Hawkins, 4 Bibb. 390 (Ky. 1816).
29 Cf. McCollum v. Smith, Meigs 342 (Tenn. 1838). Of course, the
Louisiana law, due to civil law influence, may well have reached different
conclusions than other states on these matters, anyway.
20 Blackwell v. Wilkinson, supra note 18.
21 Custis v. Fitzhugh, Jeff. 72 (Va. 1768).
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Indiana.22 "Considering them merely as property in the ab-
stract," said the court in that case, "are they personal or real
estate? They must surely be admitted to be personal. They
are persons, and are, therefore, in their nature personal. They
are movable and perishable, and therefore are not real in their
nature. The law which imparts to them, for a special purpose
and to a qualified extent, the factitious quality of realty, still
considers them, for most purposes, and to a greater extent,
personalty." Actions of detinue, trover and replevin might be
brought against a converter of a slave,23 and, in the absence of
a statute otherwise providing, they passed to the executor or
administrator, and not to the heir, on the death of the owner.2'
That attempts to create future interests in slaves were com-
mon is indicated, not only by the fact that the bulk of the
American cases involving future interests in chattels prior to
the Civil War were slave cases, but also by legislation in some
states requiring bills of sale of slaves, or instruments creating
future interests in slaves, to be registered.25
In conclusion, with reference to the significance of slave cases
as authorities, we may summarize as follows: (a) unlike most
chattels today, there was a common desire that slaves go by
devise or descent with the land of the owner; (b) slaves were
nevertheless a frequent subject of sale apart from land; (c)
22 See Sneed v. Ewing, 5 J.J. Marsh. 460, 482 (Ky. 1831).
2 Cases in which these actions are brought are numerous. Detinue for
slaves: Chinn v. Respass, 1 T. B. Mon. 25 (Ky. 1824); M'Donald, Adm'r v.
Walton, 2 Mo. 48 (1828); Clarkson v. Booth, 17 Gratt. 490 (Va. 1867);
Price v. Talley's Adm'r, 18 Ala. 21 (1850). Trover: Easley's Ex'rs v.
Easley, 18 B. Mon. 86 (Ky. 1857); Smith v. Bell, supra note 11; Booth v.
Terrell, 16 Ga. 20 (1854). Replevin: May v. Rockett, 25 Miss. 233 (1852).
24 May v. Rockett; and cf. Easley's Ex'rs v. Easley, both supra note 23.
In Chinn v. Respass, supra note 23, the court had before it the question
of whether or not a will bequeathing a testator's "personal estate" should
be construed to include slaves. The court held that slaves should be in-
cluded, observing: "Slaves were, indeed, as we have already observed,
declared by law, to be real estate, and directed, to descend as lands de-
scended, to the heir at law. But, it does not follow that the testator, by
the devise of the personal estate, did not intend that his slaves should
pass; for although slaves were, by law, made real estate, for the purposes
of descent and dower, and perhaps some others, yet they had in law many
of the attributes of personal estate. They would pass by a nuncupative
will, and lands would not; they were liable to be sold for the payment of
debts, and lands were not; they could be limited in a grant or devise, no
otherwise than personal chattels, and personal actions might be brought
to recover the possession of them. Besides, they were, in their nature,
personal estate, being movable property, and such as might attend the per-
son of the proprietor wherever he went, and in practice they were so
considered and treated by the people in general." Ibid. 28.
25 Cases in which such statutes are referred to are: Palmer v. Popelston,
8 N. C. 307 (1821) ; Lightfoot v. Strother, 9 Leigh 451 (Va. 1838); Bank
v. Holland, 99 Va. 495, 39 S. E. 126 (1901).
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since attempts to create future interests in slaves were also
frequent, we find registration legislation designed to make
slaves more readily alienable and to avoid the uncertainty of
title which might result from the existence of future interests;
(d) nevertheless, for many purposes the common law of chat-
tels personal was applied to legal interests in slaves.
We may conclude that, while precedents involving future in-
terests in slaves are not without force in some situations, these
cases must be treated in a class by themselves; and because a
rule has been applied to future interests in slaves, it does not
necessarily follow that the same rule should be applied to future
interests in chattels personal today.
(6) The modern tendency in the creation of future interests
in chattels personal is to create a trust for the benefit of the
person who is to enjoy the chattel in the future. Indeed, it
may almost be said to be a slip in draughtsmanship to create
future interests in chattels personal without the intervention
of a trust. In view of the fact, therefore, that the slave cases can-
not be given very great weight for most purposes, though they
constitute a large part of the early cases, and that the modern
cases quite generally involve a trust, we are left with few con-
trolling precedents with respect to future interests in chattels
personal cognizable by courts of law. As will appear later, in
some situations the same rules are applicable whether the future
interest be created through the intervention of a trust or not. In
this connection, it should be stated that, unless otherwise indi-
cated, the situations herein discussed are those where future
interests in chattels are sought to be created without the
intervention of a trust.
With these observations in mind, we may now proceed to
consider the applicability of the law of estates and future inter-
ests in land to future interests in chattels personal. At the
outset we may ask: what do we mean by estates in land? The
usual definition of an estate, as "such interest as the tenant
has" in lands, tenements and hereditaments,20 does not aid us
particularly in this connection. Nor do we go farther by recall-
ing that estate is from the Latin word statits and signified the
condition or circumstances of the feudal tenant with respect to
the land. This much is obvious: a property system is conceiv-
able in which there are no fixed types of interests or rigid
categories such as life estates and fees simple-in which one may
provide for practically any combination of legal consequences
26 "An estate in lands, tenements, and hereditaments, signifies such in-
terest as the tenant has therein; so that if a man grants all his estate in
Dale to A. and his heirs, everything that he can possibly grant shall pa-s
thereby." 2 BL. CoMM. *103.
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by so indicating in the creating instrument, somewhat as he
might set out the stipulations in a contract. But our land law
is not such a system. There are more or less rigid categories
called estates, differentiated from one another primarily by
provisions concerning the extent of enjoyment. If these pro-
visions as to extent are expressed in the creating instrument,
other fixed and definite legal consequences follow as to each
type of estate, such as devolution on intestacy of the owner,
liability for waste, destructibility or indestructibility, as the case
may be, whether the creator of the interest intended such
consequences or not.
The historical picture of the law of estates must not be over-
looked. No one has better expressed it than the authors of
Pollock and Maitland's History of English Law, when they say:
"Proprietary rights in land are, we may say, projected upon
the plane of time. The category of quantity, of duration, is
applied to them. The life-tenant's rights are a finite quantity;
the fee-tenant's rights are an infinite, or potentially infinite,
quantity; we see a difference in respect of duration, and this is
the one fundamental difference. . . The estate for life is
smaller than the estate in fee; it is infinitely smaller; so that if
the tenant in fee breaks off and gives away a life estate, or
twenty life estates, he still has a fee." 27
As Blackstone put it, these lesser estates-fees tail and life
estates-were "carved" out of the fee simple. There could be
any number of life estates, any number of fee tail estates, but
only one fee simple. Other writers have thought that the out-
standing feature of this historical picture of estates was that the
common law future estate, the reversion or the remainder, took
effect by way of "succession" rather than by "substitution";
that vested future interests were thought of as having a present
existence subject only to the termination of preceding estates in
possession, rather than as coming into existence when they took
effect in possession .2  While this picture is invaluable in explain-
ing the past, it is hardly adequate to interpret the present or to
predict the future.
Viewed analytically, the law of estates involves at least three
things: (1) There are certain fixed types differentiated from
each other primarily by the duration of the privilege of enjoy-
ment; they are the fee simple, the fee tail, the life estate, the
term of years, and the tenancy at will. (2) If one indicates an
intention with respect to the duration of the enjoyment of the
27 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 10.
28 See Jenks, Future Interests in Land (1904) 20 L. Q. Rnv. 280;
MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW (6th ed. 1905) § 330; GRAY, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 79, n. 3.
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land, the law implies a more or less fixed group of legal conse-
quences, whether intended by the creator of the interest or not.
(3) There are certain general rules applicable to these types of
estates as related to one another, such as rules about accelera-
tion and merger.
Estates may be either present or future. It is possible to
create a future privilege of enjoyment of land either in fee
simple, in fee tail, for life or for years.
Future estates and interests are also divided into more or less
fixed classes on the basis of the manner of creation of the inter-
est or the manner in which the interest is to take effect in
possession. These classes are ordinarily stated as follows: the
reversion, the remainder, the executory limitation, the possibility
of reverter, and the right of entry for condition broken. If
sufficient is indicated in the creating instrument to lead us to
conclude that one of these future interests has been created, a
more or less fixed group of legal consequences will follov,
whether intended by the creator of the interest or not. Likewise
there are general rules applicable to these interests as related to
each other or to interests in possession.
We are now prepared to inquire: what present privileges of
enjoyment may be created with respect to chattels personal?
Obviously, there may be an absolute transfer of the chattel.
The transferee, however, could not be said to have a fee simple,
since on his death the chattel would pass to his executor or
administrator.
No privilege of enjoyment corresponding to the fee tail
estate in land can be created in chattels. The statute De Donis
is inapplicable to chattels of any kind, and a gift of chattels to
one and the heirs of his body, or with words of the same import,
would give the donee an absolute interest.3 The law simply
29 To the effect that there can be no estate tail in personalty, and that
an attempt to create such an interest creates an absolute interest, are the
following: Young v. Kinnebrew, 36 Ala. 97 (1860); Smith .r. Greer, 88
Ala. 414, 6 So. 911 (1889) ; Denson v. Thompson, 19 Ark. 66 (1857) ; Moody
v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 (1840); Maulding v. Scott, 13 Ark. 88 (1852);
Hudson v. Wadsworth, 8 Conn. 348 (1831); Watts v. Clardy, 2 Fla. 369
(1848); Gray v. Gray, 20 Ga. 804 (1856) (statutory provsion); Albee v.
Carpenter, 12 Cush. 382 (Mass. 1853); Chism's Adm'r v. Williams, 29 Mo.
288 (1860); Floyd v. Thompson, 20 N. C. 616 (1839); Nichols v. Cart-
wright, 6 N. C. 137 (1812); King v. Beck, 12 Ohio 390 (1843); Potts'
Appeal, 30 Pa. 168 (1858); Smith's Appeal, 23 Pa. 9 (1854); Cooke v.
Bucklin, 18 R. I. 666, 29 Atl. 840 (1894); Account of Tillinghast, 25 R. I.
338, 55 Atl. 879 (1903); Dott v. Cunningham, 1 Bay 453 (S. C. 1791);
Stockton v. Martin, 2 Bay 471 (S. C. 1802); Moore v. Brooks, 12 Gratt.
135 (Va. 1855); Wiliamson v. Daniel, 12 Wheat. 568 (U. S. 1827); ef.
Goldsby v. Goldsby, 38 Ala. 404 (1862); Powell v. Glenn, 21 Ala. 459
(1852); Webbe v. Webbe, 234 Ill. 442, 84 N. E. 1054 (1908), 17 L. R. A.
(N.s.) '1079 (1909); Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 273 (1855); Eichelberger
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construes the language as an attempt, effectual though inapt, to
pass the absolute interest. It is not correct to say, however,
that every limitation which would create a fee tail in land
produces an absolute interest in personalty. In the case of a gift
over on failure of issue, the same language which is construed
to mean an indefinite failure of issue in the case of land may be
held to mean a definite failure of issue in the case of personalty."0
Thus the limitation when applied to land would give an estate
tail, but when applied to personalty the first limitation in some
cases might be construed as a gift for life, with a gift over on a
contingency.
The present privilege of enjoyment of chattels for life may
be created.1 In North Carolina the courts have held that this
may be done only by will, a gift inter vivos being construed in
that jurisdiction as a gift of the absolute interest.82
It needs no citation of authority to show that possession of
a chattel may be granted for a specific term or at will. Such
transactions are commonly called bailments33
v. Barnetz, 17 S. & R. 293 (Pa. 1828); Doty v. Chaplin, 54 Vt. 361 (1882).
One occasionally comes across statements in the opinions to the effect
that the law recognizes estates tail in chattels, but all such remarks would
seem to be incorrect. Cases of this sort are: Horton v. Upham, 72 Conn.
30, 43 AtL 492 (1899); St. John v. Dann, 66 Conn. 401, 410, 34 Atl. 110,
116 (1895); Talbot v. Snodgrass, 124 Iowa 681, 100 N. W. 500 (1904).
Attention should be called to the fact that at the present time an equit-
able fee tail estate in a chattel is permitted by the English law. See Law
of Property Act, 15 GEO. V, § 130 (1) (1925). In CHESHIRE, MODERN REAL
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) 359, the enactment is explained, in part, as follows:
"Before the Act it sometimes happened that when freeholds were limited
by settlement to a series of legal tenants for life and in tail, it was desired
to give the persons who for the time being were entitled to the land the
enjoyment of certain family heirlooms such as valuable pictures and the
like. As the heirlooms, being chattels, could not be carved into estates
in the same way as the land, the only mode of carrying out the intention
was to vest them in trustees upon trust that they should go along with
the land so far as the rules of law and equity would permlit. In such a
case law and equity permitted any legal life tenant pf the land for the
time being to have an equitable life interest in the heirlooms, but required
that the absolute ownership should vest in the first person to get an estate
tail in the land."
For a discussion of decisions prior to the Law of Property Act with
reference to settlements of heirlooms to go with land "as far as law and
equity will permit," see GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 363-367; and of.
Portman v. Portman, [1922] 2 A. C. 473, discussed by Professor Vance in
Comment (1922) 32 YAE L. J. 56-59.
so Cf. for example, Forth v. Chapman, 1 P. Wins. 663 '(1720).
32 Decisions on this point are very numerous. See the cases infra notes
34 and 36.
32 Outlaw v. Taylor, 168 N. C. 511, 84 S. E. 811 (1915); Dail v. Jones,
.85 N. C. 221 (1881); Morrow v. Williams, 14 N. C. 263 (1831); Graham
v. Graham, 9 N. C. 322 (1823).
33 Cf. May v. O'Neal, 125 Ala. 620, 28 So. 12 (1900), for an example of
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It should be further noted that there are other present inter-
ests in chattels which do not come within any of the types
mentioned. Among these are the interests of lienors, pledgees,
and conditional vendors.
Without carrying the comparison of present interests so far
as to include a discussion of special limitations and conditions
subsequent, since those matters will be referred to later, let us
now inquire to what extent future interests in chattels may be
created having the same period of enjoyment as future interests
in land. The situation in the American law may be summarized
as follows: except in Delaware and possibly Pennsylvania,
privileges of enjoyment of chattels analogous to reversipns after
life estates are permitted.34  Presumably, such a reversionary
interest would exist in the creator of a bailment for a term or
a bailment for a specified term. And cf. Bailey v. Colby, 34 N. H. 29
(1856), where the court distinguishes between the legal consequences of a
bailment at will and a bailment for a term.
The question may be raised, are not life interests in chattels merely
bailments of a sort? In Booth v. Terrell, 16 Ga. 20 (1854), the court
sought to distinguish between the formalities necessary for the creation
of a bailment for life in a chattel and a life interest. But the distinction
seems without foundation; and in the following cases a "loan for life"
was apparently regarded as indistinguishable from a gift of a chattel for
life: Watts v. Clardy, 2 Fla. 369 (1848); Nicols v. Cartwright, 6 N. C. 137
(1812). But the courts are inclined to treat a bailor's interest as a present
interesb and otherwise to regard it in a somewhat different light frnm
that of a grantor of a life interest in a chattel.
3 To the effect that a reversionary interest after a gift of a chattel for
life is valid, are the following: Evans' Appeal, 51 Conn. 435 (1883);
Haralson v. Redd, 15 Ga. 148 (1854) ; Boyd v. Strahan, 36 M11. 355 (1865) ;
McCall v. Lee, 120 Ill. 261, 11 N. E. 522 (1887); Johnson's Adm'r v.
Johnson, 104 Ky. 714, 47 S. W. 883 (1898); Nickerson v. Bowly, 8 Mete.
424 (Mass. 1844); Brown v. Kelsey, 2 Cush. 243 (Mass. 1848); Boston
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Buffum, 186 Mlass. 242, 71 N. E. 549 (1904);
State v. Probate Court, 102 Minn. 268, 113 N. W. 888 (1907); Vannerzon
v. Culbertson, 10 Sm. & M. 150 (liss. 1848); Harris v. McLaran, 30 Bliss.
533 (1855); French v. Hatch, 28 N. H. 331 (1854); Deats v. Ziegener,
82 N. J. Eq. 605, 89 Atl. 31 (1913); Anonymous, 3 N. C. 161 (1802);
James' Ex'rs v. Masters, 7 N. C. 110 (1819) ; Black v. Ray, 18 N. C. 334
(1835); Creswell v. Emberson, 41 N. C. 151 (1849); McKinley v. Scott,
49 N. C. 197 (1856); Geiger v. 'Brown, 4 McC. 427 (S. C. 1828); Morris
v. Owen, 2 Call. 520 (Va. 1801); Bartlett v. Patton, 33 W. Va. 71, 10
S. E. 21, 5 L. R. A. 523 (1889). Contra: State v. Savin, 4 Har. 56, n.
(Del. 1843); Derickson v. Garden, 5 Del. Ch. 323 (1880); Williams v.
Floyd, 12 Del. Ch. 256, 112 A. 377 (1920); Grant v. Mullen, 15 Del.
Ch. 174, 138 Atl. 613 (1926). Cf. also Appeal of Merkel, 109 Pa. 235
(1885); Drennan's Appeal, 118 Pa. 176, 12 Atl. 348 (1888); Kang's Es-
tate, 185 Pa. 544, 40 Atl. 90 (1898); In re Rogers' Estate, 245 Pa. 206,
91 Atl. 351 (1914); Freeman's Estate, 220 Pa. 343, 69 Ati. 816 (1908);
Bank v. Hartman, 8 Pa. Super. 170 (1898); Hartman's Estate, 11 Pa.
Super. 35 (1899); Simpson's Estate, 34 Pa. Super. 115 (1907); Yeity's Es-
tate, 90 Pa. Super. 130 (1926).
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at will, though the courts would probably regard it as a present
interest.35 An interest analogous to a remainder after a life
estate may also be created.3 6 Such a remainder interest may
either be limited to take effect at all events on the termination
of the life interest, or it may be limited to take effect on some
condition precedent in addition to the termination of the life
interest. That is, it may be like a vested remainder or like a
contingent remainder as to the privilege of enjoyment. Could
a "vested" or "contingent remainder interest" be created in a
chattel to take effect after an interest for a term or at will?
There seems to be little authority on the point, but no reason is
perceived why it could not be done.37 A gift over of a chattel
after a present gift to one and his executors, administrators,
35 See supra note 33.
38 To the effect that an interest in the nature of a remainder, after a
gift of a chattel for life, may be created, are the following: Underwood
v. Underwood, 162 Ala. 553, 50 So. 305 (1909); King v. Stevens, 146 Ark.
443, 225 S. W. 656 (1920); Bishop v. Groton Say. Bank, 96 Conn. 325, 114
Atl. 88 (1921); Longworthy v. Chadwick, 13 Conn. 42 (1838); Griggs v.
Dodge, 2 Day 28 (Conn. 1805); Taber v. Packwood, 2 Day 52 (Conn.
1805); State v. Warrington's Ex'r, 4 Har. 55 (Del. 1843); Williams v.
Floyd, supra note 34; Horn's Ex'rs v. Gartman, 1 Fla. 63 (1846); Craw-
ford v. Clark, 110 Ga. 729, 36 S. E. 404 (1900); Phillips v. Crews, 65 Ga.
274 (1880); Hetfield v. Fowler, 60 Ill. 45 (1871); Trogdon, Adm'r v.
Murphy, 85 Ill. 119 (1877); Pratt v. Skiff, 289 Ill. 268, 124 N. E. 534
(1919); Gahan v. Golden, 330 Ill. 624, 162 N. E. 164 (1928); Dickinson
v. Griggsville National Bank, 209 Ill. 350, 70 N. E. 593 (1904); Chase
v. Howie, 64 Kan. 320, 67 Pac. 822 (1902); Hornsby v. Hornsby, 185 Ky.
847, 216 S. W. 88 (1919); Stallcup v. Cronley's Trustee, 117 Ky. 547, 78
S. W. 441 (1904); Grayson v. Tyler's Adm'x, 80 Ky. 358 (1882); Knight
v. Donahoo's Heirs, 3 B. Mon. 277 (Ky. 1842); Keen & West v. Macey, 3
Bibb. 39 (Ky. 1813); Sampson v. Randall, 72 Me. 109 (1881); Sellick v.
Sellick, 207 Mich. 194, 173 N. W. 609 (1919), 5 A. L. R. 1621 (1920);
Stuart v. Swanzy, 12 Sm. & M. 684 (Miss. 1849); Hitchcock v. Glendennin,
6 Mo. App. 99 (1878); Abbott v. Wagner, 108 Neb. 359, 188 N. W. 113
(1922); In re Van Wagoner's Estate, 97 Atl. 893 (N. J. Preog. 1916);
Westcott v. Cady, 5 Johns. Ch. 334 (N. Y. 1821); Matter of Brandreth's
Estate, 169 N. Y. 437, 62 N. E. 563 (1902) ; Smith v. Van Ostrand, 64 N. Y.
278 (1876) ; Snedeker v. Congdon, 41 App. Div. 433, 58 N. Y. Supp. 885 (2d
Dept. 1899); Bogle v. N. C. R. R., 51 N. C. 419 (1859); Min Young v.
Min Young, 47 Ohio St. 501, 25 N. E. 168 (1890) ; Cook v. Collier, 62 S. W.
658 (Tenn. Ch. 1901) ; Bufford v. Holliman, 10 Tex. 560 (1853) ; Bradley v.
Mosby, 3 Call 44 (Va. 1801) ; Clarkson v. Booth, 17 Gratt. 490 (Va. 1867) ;
Morse v. Stoddard's Estate, 90 Vt. 479, 98 Atl. 991 (1916); Smith v. Bell,
;upra note 11.
3 In Merrill v. Tevis, 2 Dana 162 (Ky. 1834), the court assumed that a
-emainder after an interest in a chattel for a fixed term could be created,
and discussed the future interest in question as if it were of that sort, but
the facts indicate it was rather a reversionary interest after a bailment for
a term. Jolly v. Wills, 2 Ch. R. 137, 21 Repr. 639 (1678-79) holds that such
an interest is valid. Cf. Shafer v. Tereso, 133 Iowa 342, 110 N. W. 846
(1907).
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and assigns is valid.3s Such a future interest is like an execu-
tory limitation as to the privilege of enjoyment. When the
owner of a fee simple absolute in land conveys a determinable
fee, he retains a possibility of reverter.39 Suppose chattels were
given to A, his executors and administrators, so long as a certain
oak tree stands. Would A retain a future privilege of enjoyment
like a possibility of reverter in land? In Matter of Terry,-0 a
case involving the application of the New York succession tax,
a will bequeathed certain legacies to a charitable corporation,
"to be retained by it so long and so long only as the said corpora-
tion shall continue to exist under its present name and maintain
under that name a home for destitute aged men and women
in the said village. . . ." The will further provided that if the
corporation should cease to exist under said name or cease to
maintain a home as provided, the principal of the fund should
go to testator's heirs at law. The court referred to the interest
of the heirs as a possibility of reverter and evidently regarded
it as valid; but all the court actually decided was that the heirs
were under no duty to pay the tax while the property was prop-
erly held by the charitable corporation. Without doubt such a
privilege of enjoyment could be created. 1 Cases like O'Mahoncy
38 Cases recognizing the validity of executory interests in chattels per-
sonal are numerous. To that effect are: Hudson v. Wadsworth, supra note
29; Bradford v. Mackenzie, 131 Md. 330, 101 Atl. 774 (1917); Homer v.
Shelton, 2 Metc. 194 (Mass. 1841); Norris v. Beyea, supra note 29;
Moffat's Ex'rs v. Strong, 10 Johns. 12 (N. Y. 1813) ; Haughton v. Benbury,
55 N. C. 337 (1856); Briggs v. Hopkins, 103 Ohio St. 321, 132 N. E. 843
(1921); Rapp v. Rapp. 6 Pa. 45 (1847); Hill v. Hill, Dud. Eq. 71 (S. C.
1836) ; Brummet v. Barber, 2 Hill 543 (S. C. 1834) ; Behrens v. Baumann,
66 W. Va. 56, 66 S. E. 5 (1909); fDunn v. Bray, 1 Call 338 (Va. 1798).
And see cases cited in Gray, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 607, n. 5.
A number of Arkansas cases, following a dictum in Mloody v. Walker,
3 Ark. 147 (1840), have taken the position that an executory limitation
cannot be created in a chattel. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 23 Ark. 356 (1861) ;
Robinson v. Bishop, 23 Ark. 378 (1861); Scull v. Vaugine, 15 Ark. 695
(1855) ; Gaines v. Briggs, 9 Ark. 46 (1848). This conclusion may be traced
to a dictum in Patterson v. Ellis, 11 Wend. 259 (N. Y. 1833), since repudi-
ated in New York [Norris v. Beyea, supra note 29], and on a statement of
Kent's [2 KENT Com. *352] which was misconstrued, and indeed mis-
quoted. Further doubt is thrown on the Arkansas decisions by the dictum
of the court in Bunch v. Nicks, 50 Ark. 367, 376 (1887).
The validity of an executory limitation in a chattel has also been denied
in Talbot v. Snodgrass, supra note 29.
39 See Powell, op. cit. supra note 4; Vance, Rights of Rercrter and the
Statute Quia Emptoes (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 593.
4 218 N. Y. 218, 220, 112 N. E. 931, 932 (1916). It may be noted that in
New York a statute makes certain provisions with reference to the limita-
tion of future interests in personalty. See infra note 110.
- To that effect is also the case of Gamble v. Gates, 92 Mich. 510, 52
N. W. 941 (1892). In Boal v. Metropolitan Museum, 292 Fed. 303, 305 (S.
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v. Burdett"4 and Horn v. Foley,43 sustaining a reverter on the
failure of a succeeding interest, would seem to be authorities
for that proposition.
Could there be an interest in personalty analogous to a right
of entry for condition broken? The very phrase seems to indi-
cate a denial of the proposition, since one cannot "enter" chattels
nor have a right to do so. The actual entry feature of the in-
terest in land, however, has pretty much faded out of the picture
in recent years. What the grantor of land with a condition sub-
sequent has is a power to terminate the grantee's interest when
the condition is broken, and an option or privilege to exercise
the power. The real question is, can one grant a chattel on a
condition subsequent in such a way that on the breach of the
condition the grantee's interest will not terminate, but will only
terminate on the grantor exercising an option to terminate it?
In Green v. Old People's Home" the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that a legacy bequeathed to the Old People's Home was upon
a condition subsequent and not a conditional limitation. The
court indicated that the condition subsequent operated like the
corresponding interest in land, so that the present estate was not
divested until a forfeiture was declared. The court held valid
the power of the testator's heir to declare a forfeiture, observing'
that:
"The rule in this state is that the general principles applicable
to the vesting of real estate apply, generally, to gifts of personal
property [citing cases]; and the fact that the gifts in question
are of personal property instead of real estate will therefore
make no difference in our consideration of this question."" 4
In Palmer v. President of Union Bank 4 the same distinction
D. N. Y. 1923), rev'd, 298 Fed. 894, 903 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), Judge Learned
Hand recognizes that an interest like a base or determinable fee could be
created in a chattel.
42 7 Eng. & Ir. App. 388 (1874).
4313 App. D. C. 184 (1898).
44269 Ill. 134, 109 N. E. 701 (1915).
45Ibid. 142, 109 N. E. at 704.
4617 R. I. 627, 24 Atl. 109 (1892). In that case the court said: "Pro-
visions of this sort are of two kinds,-one, where upon failure of the trust
there is a condition of reverter to the grantor or his heirs; and the other
where there is a limitation over to others, in a manner which makes it
possible for the time of taking to go beyond the alloted time of a life or
lives in being and 21 years thereafter. The former case is not within the
rule against perpetuities, because a present vested and transmissible inter-
est is reserved; a right of entry upon condition broken.... The validity of
such a provision, therefore, depends upon the question whether it is a
condition or a conditional limitation." Ibid. 632, 24 Atl. at 110.
While the observations are open to serious criticism, it would seem, since
the case concerned personalty, that the court thought there was something
known as a right of entry in personalty.
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was made between a condition and a conditional limitation in
chattels, though the remarks are mere dicta.
In addition to these future privileges of enjoyment similar to
those involved in future interests in land, may also be men-
tioned the interest of the conditional vendee in a conditional
sale, the interest of a pledgor, and the interest of a lienee. It
is difficult if not impossible to force these interests into any of
the categories we have considered. The extent and character
of the future enjoyment depends ordinarily upon certain types
of contracts. It is true that these interests are not ordinarily
spoken of as future interests, but there is a future privilege of
enjoyment which would seem to be somewhat like that involved
in the usual types of future interests. It may also be suggested
that likewise in the land law there are certain interests which
do not fit into the categories, such as the interests of the mort-
gagor and mortgagee, the interest of the beneficiary of a result-
ing trust, a wife's inchoate dower interest, or, in early English
law, the so-called tenancy by elegit. Hence the existence of
these anomalous interests does not totally preclude us from fb1-
lowing the analogy of the land law if it is otherwise desirable.
More difficulties arise, however, when we begin to consider
the other legal consequences attached to these respective privi-
leges of enjoyment which correspond to legal relations involved
in future interests in land. According to the common law, the
reversion and the vested remainder in land involved a power of
alienation. Apparently the right of entry, the possibility of
reverter, and also the contingent remainder and executory limi-
tation were regarded as inalienable. But in some cases at least,
the two types last mentioned may now, in many jurisdictions, be
alienated. Is the same true of the analogous interests in per-
sonalty? Without doubt, "reversions" and certain forms of "re-
mainders" and "executory limitations" in personalty have been
held to be alienable.47 Whether interests like possibilities of re-
verter and rights of entry in personalty (if there be such inter-
ests) are alienable, the cases do not disclose. In Palmer v.
President of Union Bank 4 the court said such an interest was
alienable, but this observation can hardly be relied upon.
If there is such a thing as a "right of entry" in personalty,
we would naturally inquire, do the doctrines of waiver apply to
it? And is it subject to the rule against perpetuities? As to
4- Smith v. Bell, supra note 11; Franklin v. Roberts, 36 N. C. 560 (1843) ;
Ray v. West, 194 Ky. 96, 238 S. W. 167 (1922); Real Estate Co. v. Dear-
born, 119 Me. 168, 109 Atl. 816 (1920); National Park Bank v. Billings,
144 App. Div. 536, 129 N. Y. Supp. 846 (1st Dep't 1911); Grayson v. Tyler's
Adm'x, supra note 36.
48 Supra note 46.
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waiver, nothing can be said. In Green v. Old People's Home 49
it is clear that the so-called "right of entry" was not regarded as
subject to the rule against perpetuities, for otherwise it would
have been held void. The dictum in Palmer v. President of
Union Bank 50 is likewise to the effect that the rule does not ap-
ply to such an interest. As a matter of fact it is difficult to see
how the existence of such an interest can be justified. No doubt,
there would be no legal objection to a donor of a chattel reserv-
ing to himself a power to revest title in himself. The doctrines
as to powers of appointment would seem to be ample to cover
such a situation; and no reason is perceived why such a power
could not operate by way of executory limitation, unless there
be some doctrine that there can be no executory limitation in a
donor. But it would seem that such an interest should be sub-
ject to the rule against perpetuities.
In the land law we have an elaborate system of rules as to
the extent of the privilege of enjoyment of the holder of the
present interest and as to the right of the owner of the future
interest to bring an action at law or in equity when he oversteps
the bounds of those privileges. Such an overstepping of the
privileges is ordinarily referred to as waste, and varies where
the holder of the present interest has a tenancy at will, a term
of years, a life estate, or an estate tail. It would appear that
the cases disclose no such elaborate gradation of privileges in
the case of chattels. The privileges of the holder of a chattel
at will or for a term are pretty much determined by contract.
But this is really a matter of the law of bailments and can hardly
be discussed at length here. In the case of land, it seems that
there are many situations where the holder of the future interest
would have no right of action regardless of the sort of user to
which the land was being subjected. Instances of this might
arise in the case of a remainder after a fee tail or an executory
limitation after a fee simpleA1 Yet, so far as can be ascertained
from the cases, the holder of a future interest in chattels would
never be without a remedy.52  This conclusion seems reasonable
when we consider that the present holder of a chattel can totally
destroy it, but one cannot totally destroy the subject matter of
49 Supra note 44.
50 Supra note 46.
51 Equity will give relief in either case under certain conditions, but cer-
tainly not as a matter of course merely because injury to the fee is threat-
ened. See 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d. ed. 1919) § 1906; Gan-
non v. Peterson, 193 Ill. 372, 62 N. E. 210 (1901). And see Note (1921) 14
A. L. R. 1066-1083.
52 That is to say, mere threatened danger is sufficient to entitle one to a
remedy regardless of the degree of probability of his interest taking effect
in possession and enjoyment. Cf. Horton v. Upham; Hudson v. Wadsworth;
Eichelberger v. Barnetz, all supra note 29.
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a present interest in land. Moreover, the law of personal prop-
erty gives a remedy to the holder of a future interest which has
no counterpart in the land law; he may come into equity under
certain circumstances and demand that the holder of the present
interest give security.
In the land law, by the rule in Shelley's case, a gift to A for
life, remainder to his heirs, operates to give A a fee simple.
But a like gift of chattels will have no such effect, for the courts
have repeatedly held that the rule in Shelley's case is inapplicable
to personal property.'
Coming now to the more general aspects of the law of estates
we may ask: Mist a remainder in a chattel take effect in pos-
session at the termination of the preceding estate, however and
whenever that may occur? Is there any rule that a contingent
remainder in a chattel is destructible by merger or forfeiture
of the preceding estate while an executory limitation is not? Is
the doctrine of merger applicable to personalty at all? Is there
a rule that a grantor of a life estate followed by a contingent
remainder retains a reversionary interest until the contingency
vests? To most of these questions we may answer that so far
as American decisions are concerned, we cannot tell. One case
seems to have held that a contingent remainder could fail by the
determination of the preceding estate,54 and another, a slave
case, assumed that the holder of the present interest could ter-
minate a contingent remainder by a tortious sale.5 Both con-
clusions seem unsound. The doctrine of destructibility is a re-
sult of the rule that the seisin must pass immediately on the
termination of a present estate. Seisin has no relation to the
modern law of chattels. If, as has been held,-" the doctrine of
destructibility has no relation to equitable interest in land, it
would seem it should have no relation to interests in the nature
of contingent remainders in personalty. Clearly the doctrine of
53 While it is sometimes held that the rule in Shelley's case is applicable
to personalty by way of analogy or as a mere rule of construction, strictly
speaking the rule is not applicable to personalty. To that effect are: Belle-
ville Savings Bank v. Anelshaensel, 298 Ill. 292, 131 N. E. 682 (1921);
Glover v. Condell, 163 Ill. 566, 45 N. E. 173, 35 L. RI. A. 30 (1896);
Jones v. Rees, 6 Pennew. 504, 69 Atl. 785 (Del. 1908); Hall v. Gradwvohl,
113 Md. 293, 77 Atl. 480 (1910); Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195
Mass. 575, 81 N. E. 300 (1907); Evans v. Weatherhead, 24 R. I. 502, 53
Atl. 866 (1902). For further citation of cases see: Notes (1905) 4 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 471; (1910) 29 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1146; (1909) 12 ANN. C,%s. 839;
(1908) 8 COL. L. REv. 573; (1909) 23 HARy. L. REv. 51; (1909) 4 ILL. L.
Rnv. 639.
54 Cole v. Cole, 292 Ill. 154, 126 N. E. 752 (1920), 38 A. L. R. 719 (1925).
55 Price v. Price, 5 Ala. 578 (1843). But see Pickett v. Doe, 74 Ala. 122,
129 (1883); and cf. Jones Ex'rs v. Hoskins, 18 Ala. 489 (1850).
56 Cf. Astley v. Mickelthwait, 15 Ch. D. 59 (1880); Abbiss v. Burney,
1T Ch. D. 211 (1881).
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forfeiture, which involved a wrong to the lord of the manor,
should have no application to chattels. 57  As to the doctrine of.
merger, dicta may occasionally be found to the effect that it
applies to chattels.58 Such an observation is quite harmless, if
all that is meant is that where A has a life interest and also a
succeeding remainder those are treated as one interest 0 But
the conclusion seems unwarranted that a "merger" of chattel
interests could destroy contingent interests, though in the one
case already referred to that appears to have been held.
While space does not permit us to consider the difficult ques-
tion of acceleration of future interests, it may be suggested that
in general a future interest in personalty is accelerated on failure
of a succeeding interest on the theory of construing a testator's
intent, and not because this particular type of interest must be
accelerated as a matter of law. It is believed that a careful
analysis of the cases would disclose a difference between legal
interests in land and in chattels in this particular.
Suppose A gives a chattel to B for life, and, if B marries G,
then to the children of B and C. Does A have a reversionary
interest before B marries C? Suppose A purports to assign
such an interest to X during the life of B, and then B never
marries C. Does X get the chattel on B's death? Again the
cases give us no conclusive answer. 0 Professor Gray insisted
that there was no doctrine that the "fee" could not be in abey-
ance in respect to chattels, and he would therefore have said
that X got nothing.6 1
A much more significant point of comparison is this. Suppose
the holder of a life interest in a chattel should sell it for value
to one who had no notice of the future interest. Would the pur-
chaser take as against the holder of the future interest? That
is: has the holder of a life interest in a chattel the power to de-
stroy future interests by a sale to a bona fide purchaser? Obvi-
ously if he has, the future interest is very unlike the analogous
w But in some of the slave cases American courts have applied the doc-
trine of forfeiture. A leading case is Broome v. King, 10 Ala. 819 (1846).
See cases cited supra note 55. In Price v. Price's Adm'r, 23 Ala. 609, 612
(1853), however, Chilton, C. J., in a concurring opinion, said: "The rule
that a particular estate is required to support a contingent remainder is
founded upon feudal reasons, which have no application to personal prop-
erty, and no such estate is necessary to support such remainder in chattels."
5S In re Washburn's Estate, 11 Cal. App. 735, 746,106 Pac. 415,420 (1910):
"The merger here claimed is of interests in personal property, and if the
doctrine of merger may apply in such a case, which is certainly unusual,
the same principles would apply as in cases of real estate, we should think."
•9 Cf. In re Bloodgood, 184 App. Div. 798, 172 N. Y. Supp. 509 (3d Dept.
1918), which was such a case.
60 But cf. King v. Mitchell, 8 Pet. 326 (U. S. 1834).
61 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 604, n. 1.
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interests in land. Yet if such a result were possible in the pres-
ent state of the decisions, much could be said in favor of
it. Suppose A has a life interest in a Rolls-Royce car. Would
it not work a great hardship on a bona fide purchaser from A to
discover, after some time, that the car had been devised to A for
life only, that A had died and that the car belonged to the re-
mainderman, B? Aside from such protection as may be afford-
ed under fling or registration statutes, the purchaser has no
way of finding out the state of A's title. True, any purchaser
of a chattel is bound at his peril to ascertain the state of his
vendor's title, if he would acquire one himself. But our situa-
tion is essentially different from that where one purchases from
a thief. A is rightfully in possession; moreover, he is not a mere
temporary possessor; his possession is for the term of his life.
The circumstances all point to him as owner. Hence, it would
seem fair that a bona fide purchaser from him should acquire
good title.
Will the present state of the authorities permit such a result?
As has already been suggested, Professor Gray discussed sub-
stantially this proposition when, he inquired whether the life
tenant could be regarded as a sort of trustee for himself and the
remainderman.62 His conclusion, as was also that of Professor
Holdsworth,63 was to the effect that the authorities do not sus-
tain this view. However, it is believed that the historical
materials do not preclude the view suggested. Indeed, no less
an authority than Fearne seems to have favored this theory,"
as does also the author of the eighteenth edition of Williams on
Personal Property.r5
The historical argument against the view that the holder of
the present interest has the power to pass an absolute title to
a purchaser for value is based to a large extent on the case of
Hoare v. Parker," which Professor Gray admits furnishes "a
dangerous ground for argument." rT According to the report of
that case it involved an action of trover for plate by one who
claimed under a remainderman against a party to whom it was
pawned for value by a tenant for life. At the time the action
was brought, the life tenant was dead. The pledgee had no no-
tice of the remainderman's interest. The plaintiff was permitted
to recover. The case does not disclose what the settlement was
except that the plate was given to trustees for the use of the
life tenant durante viduitazte. But it would seem that the life
62 Ibid. 70.
63 7 HOLDSWORTH, loc. cit. supra note 3.
04 FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (10th ed. 1844) 401, 413.
05 W.LiAs, PERSONAL PROPERTY (18th ed. 1926) 48.
66 2 T. R. 376 (1788).
7 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 70.
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tenant had only an equitable interest as a beneficiary and there-
fore the case is hardly a precedent for a case where there was
no trust, the life holder having a legal interest. Indeed, the
report is too obscure to amount to much as a precedent.'8
Moreover, the English case of In re Swan - clearly indicates
that the trust theory was still regarded as possible in 1915 when
that case was decided. The facts were that a testatrix had be-
queathed certain jewelry to her daughter for life with a
remainder to her son. On the daughter's death some of the
articles were found to have been broken up and others were
missing. The son brought an action for compensation out of the
daughter's estate. This was resisted on the ground that, the
action being based solely on tort, it died with the person. The
court allowed compensation on the theory that the action was
not one of tort, but rather for the breach of duty of a trustee
or fiduciary. Sargent, J., in the opinion of the court, said:
"... I see no reason why the first taker should not be
deemed as to the possession of the articles to be a trustee for
the remainderman subject to her own life interest, and to be
subject in that respect to the ordinary law of trust; or, if that
is not a correct way of putting it, it may well be that the first
taker is in the position of a bailee of the article the possession
of which on her death she is through her legal personal
representative bound to deliver over to the ultimate taker." 10
Among the American decisions, aside from the slave cases,
none have been found where an action has arisen between a
remainderman and a bona fide purchaser from the holder of a
life interest in a chattel. At least three slave cases involve the
rights of a bona fide purchaser. In one of them the holder of an
executory limitation recovered in trover against the bona fide
purchaser from the holder of the present interest; 71 in another
a remainderman came into equity and compelled a bona fide
purchaser from the life holder to give security for the safe
keeping of the chattel pending the determination of the life
interest; 72 and in the third case remaindermen were given relief
in a bill in equity against a bona fide purchaser from the life
holder.7 3 It is doubtful if there are any other cases presenting
this situation. Another slave case involves an action by the
68 And see the suggestion in 7 HOLDSwORTH, loc. cit. supra note 3, that
the trust theory was perhaps forwarded by one or two seventeenth century
cases.
69 [1915] 1 Ch. 829.
70 Ibid. 835.
71 Rogers v. Randall, 2 Spear 38 (S. C. 1843).
2 Lyde v. Taylor, 17 Ala. 270 (1850). But cf. Chisholm v. Starke, 3
Call 25 (Va. 1801).
73 Jones v. Zollicoffer, N. C. Term R. 212 (1817).
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remainderman to recover on a contract made by the life tenant
on the theory that the plaintiff was the beneficiary of a trust.
The court refused to allow a recovery on this theory"
In view of what has already been said about the significance
of the slave cases as precedents, it would seem that these three
decisions would hardly be enough to lead us to conclude that a
remainderman's interest in a chattel is indestructible by the
holder of the life interest.
There is, however, another line of cases, nearly all of which
involve slaves. In these cases, the remainderman sues, ordin-
arily after the death of the holder for life, but before the
remainderman has acquired possession, the form of the action
being trover, detinue, replevin, or some other action at law.
These decisions recognize that he can recover in these actions
in a court of law.7 5  Thus it may be argued, since these are
actions at law, the remainderman has a legal, not an equitable
interest, which must be indestructible. In the first place, in
answer to such a contention, it should be said that, when the
slave cases are eliminated, only a few are left. In the second
place, even if we recognize these cases as authority for the
proposition that an action by the remainderman in a court of
law will lie, it does not follow that the future interest is in-
destructible by a sale by the life owner to a bona fide purchaser.
It should be noted that we do not have to say that the life holder
is a trustee, thus implying all the legal consequences of that
category in the law, nor do we need to say that the remainder-
74 See Bogle v. N. C. R. R., supra note 36, at 420: "The position that a
tenant for life is a trustee or quasi trustee for the remainderman is not
tenable." The action was assumpsit. Cf. Russell v. Kearney, 27 Ga. 96
(1859); Ltfferty's Ex'r. v. Murray, 27 Tex. 372 (1864); see Burnett V.
Roberts, 15 N. C. 81, 82 (1833).
75 Woodley v. Findlay, 9 Ala. 716 (1846) (detinue for a slave); Price v.
Price, supra note 55 (detinue for slaves); Thrasher v. Ingram, 32 Ala.
645 (1858) (detinue for slaves); Taber v. Packwood, 2 Day 52 (Conn.
1805) (action on the case); Griggs v. Dodge, 2 Day 28 (Conn. 1805) (ac-
count); Lott v. Meacham, 4 Fla. 144 (1851) (replevin for slalks); Booth
v. Terrell, 16 Ga. 20 (1854) (trover for slaves); Phillips v. Crews, 65 Ga.
274 (1880) (apparently action for money had and received); Sharman v.
Jackson, 30 Ga. 224 (1860) (trover for slaves); Keen v. Macey, 3 Bibb. 39
(Ky. 1813) (judgment for purchaser from life tenant in action of detinue
for slaves, reversed); Adie v. Cornwell, 3 T. B. Mon. 276 (Ky. 1320)
(detinue for slaves) ; M'Call v. Lewis, 1 Strob. 442 (S. C. 1847) (trover
for slaves); Nix v. Ray, 5 Rich. 423 (S. C. 1852) (trover for slave);
Bradley v. Mosby, supra note 36 (detinue for slaves).
Similar cases may be found with respect to an action by the holder of
an executory limitation in a chattel. Rogers v. Randall, cupra note 71
(trover for slaves) ; Clarkson v. Booth, supra note 36 (detinue for slave) ;
Dashiell v. Dashiell, 2 Har. & G. 127 (Did. 1828) (detinue for slaves);
Royall v. Eppes, 2 Munf. 479 (Va. 1811) (detinue for slaves); cf. Bartlett
v. Patton, 33 W. Va. 71, 10 S. E. 21 (1889) (assumpsit by a reversioner).
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man has an equitable interest. All we need to conclude is that
the life holder has a power to extinguish the remainder by
alienating to a bona fide purchaser, and the remainderman is
under a liability to have his interest extinguished under those
circumstances. The complete "bundle" of legal relations im-
plied in the terms "trust" and "equitable interest" need not be
dragged into the discussion. If it be asked: under what concept
of the common law do you explain this rule if not under the
trust theory?-it might be answered that the law should not
be permitted to fail for want of a category. But in fact, if
analogies are necessary, one need not seek far to find them. A
conditional vendor of a chattel under modern statutes, the owner
of a bearer negotiable instrument, of a bill of lading ifidorsed in
blank, or of a share of corporate stock indorsed in blank under
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, is under a liability to have
his ownership cut off in the hands of a bona fide purchaser. Yet
we do not call his interest an equity.
But if the equitable or trust theory is still insisted upon as an
explanation of the power of the life holder to 'defeat future in-
terests, nevertheless the recognition of the remainderman's
privilege of bringing these actions in a court of law may not be
fatal to the theory. The beneficiary of a trust may sometimes
bring an action at law in the protection of his equitable inter-
est.70 What we are concerned with here is not remedies but a
theory of substantive legal relations.
While there seems to be no case holding that a bona fide pur-
chaser in the situation under discussion may win in an action
against him by the remainderman, there are a few American
decisions in which a trust theory is clearly adhered to. It must
be conceded, however, that on analysis these cases prove little.
Abbott v. Wagner,77 a recent Nebraska case, is typical. The
facts involved a life estate coupled with a limited power of dis-
posal, and a remainder. A bill in equity was brought by the
remainderman in the life of the life holder to charge the trans-
feree of the latter as a constructive trustee for the benefit of
the remainderman. Relief was granted on this theory, the court
observing:
"But if we are to recognize that the remainderman, in such a
case, has any interest in the property which courts of equity
will protect from waste, fraud, profligacy, and wilful and reck-
less extravagance on the part of the life tenant; after coming
into possession, then certainly the court not only has the power,
but is under a solemn duty, to do all things necessary to afford
76 See BOGERT, TRUSTS (1st ed. 1921) 467, 468.
77 108 Neb. 359, 188 N. W. 113 (1922).
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such protection either by requiring adequate security or
appointing a new trustee." 78
Similar dicta are found in two slave cases where the question of
requiring security of the life tenant or an accounting in equity
was up for discussion. In Horry v. Glver, Chancellor Harper
said:
"It is hardly necessary to say, that at common law, there
could be no limitation of personal chattels to one for life, with
remainder to another, and that a gift for a day or an hour,
vested the whole in the first taker. Executory devises and the
limitations of the trusts of personalty, by which alone such
dispositions can be rendered effectual, are exclusively the
creatures of Equity." "°
And in Smith v. Daniel the court said:
"A tenaiit for life is considered in the nature of a trustee for
those in remainder, and the court may, therefore, take all the
necessary steps to prevent or restrain an abuse of his trust." 8)
Similar dicta are to be found in other decisions.81 The difficulty
with cases of this sort is that they are merely deciding that the
life holder is under a fiduciary duty to the remainderman to
preserve the property. But the argument we have already made
with respect to the use of actions at law duts both ways. Be-
cause the life holder is under a fiduciary duty, it does not follow
that we should put him in the category of trustee and thus give
him a power to pass an absolute title to a bona fide purchaser.
Because a life tenant of land is liable in an equitable action for
waste by the remainderman it does not follow that the life tenant
is a trustee.
From the American authorities it is evident that we can draw
no conclusions about the point under consideration. A few
slave cases will not justify us in holding that the life holder
cannot destroy the remainder. On the other hand we have no
direct authority to the effect that he can destroy it.
Is it not possible, however, to discern some rather definite
tendencies in the law, from which we may predict the action of
the courts? Certainly the trend today is in favor of greater
alienability of chattels. Uniform bills of lading acts, uniform
stock transfer acts, uniform warehouse receipts acts, and uni-
7sIbid. 380, 188 N. W. at 121.
-92 Hill Eq. 515, 522 (S. C. 1837).
80 2 McCord Eq. 143, 149 (S. C. 1827).
81 Damon v. Dickson, 7 Hawaii 699 (1889) ; Welsch v. Belleville Savings
Bank, 94 Ill. 191 (1879); Glover v. Condell, supra note 53; Homer v.
Shelton, supra note 38; Leggett v. Stevens, 185 N. Y. 70, 77 N. E. 874
(1906); Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N. Y. 66, 108 N. E. 210 (1915).
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form conditional sales acts all show the tendency to protect the
purchaser of a chattel.
Much more definite evidence of the tendency to protect the
purchaser from the holder of the present interest is found in a
group of statutes requiring the recording of instruments creat-
ing certain types of future interests in chattels. While these
statutes vary considerably, the Alabama statute will illustrate
the type. Section 6893 of the Alabama Code of 1928 is as
follows:
"All loans in writing, wills, or conveyances creating estates
in personal property, on condition, in reversion, or remainder,
or in which the use is separated from the right, other than the
conveyances hereinbefore in this article specified, and under
which possession is suffered to remain for three years with the
party entitled to the estate or use, vest an absolute estate in
the person so having possession for such number of years, as to
creditors and purchasers of such person, unless such loan, will,
or conveyance is recorded within such time in the county where
such property is." 82
Similar statutes are found in Arkansas, s Florida,' Illinois,8"
Kansas,'9 Kentucky, 87 Missouri,88 Mississippi,89 Ohio,9' Tennes-
see,9' Texas, 2 Virginia,' 3 and West Virginia."' Of course, these
statutes are not recent. The Virginia statute, for example, was
enacted in substantially its present form in 1785.11, Moreover,
the force and effect of a few of the statutes may be weakened
by a somewhat obscure provision apparently excluding its appli-
cation to ". . . any estate or interest . . . which shall be upon
valuable consideration and bona fide and lawfully conveyed." "o
Yet they do show appreciation of a necessity which arose as soon
as life interests and other long term interests in chattels were
common. It may be said that these statutes do not purport to
declare the common law, and that they may indicate that prior
to their enactment the common law was otherwise. In reply it
82 ALA. GEN. CODE (1928) § 6893. See also §§ 6894, 6869.
83 ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) §§ 4877, 4879.
84 FLA. GEN. LAws (Skillman, 1927) § 5778.
85 ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 59, §§ 6-8.
86 KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 33, § 104.
87 KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) § 1909.
88 Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) § 2279; cf. § 2281.
s9 Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1927) §§ 3327, 3328.
90 OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 8619.
91 TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1917) § 3152.
92 TEX. STAT. (1928) § 3969. But cf. Lafferty's Ex'r v. Murray, supra
note 74.
" VA. CODE ANN. (1923) § 5188.
94 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 74, § 3.
95 VA. REV. CODE (1803) 16.
96 ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 4879.
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may be answered: whatever the legislators may have thought,
the common law was not settled on the subject about which they
were legislating, nor indeed can it be regarded as settled today.
But these statutes may give us some indication as to the lines
along which it ought to be settled.
One rather serious objection to the position contended for,
however, has not yet been mentioned. Whatever we may say
about future interests following life interests in chattels, the
authorities are clear that, in the absence of statutes, a bailee
cannot cut off the interest of a bailor by a sale to a bona fide
purchaser, nor can a conditional vendee cut off the interest of
a conditional vendor in this manner.P7 In the case of conditional
sales this situation has been remedied to a considerable extent
by statutes, but it must be conceded that the statutes changed
the common law. However, is it not possible to distinguish be-
tween a future interest after a term in a chattel and a future
interest after a life interest? The former (ordinarily termed a
bailment) is, as a practical matter, generally temporary, of short
duration. True, the law does not require this. A bailment may
be for a hundred years if the parties desire. But experience
shows that people, as a rule, do not make sudh bailments. On
the other hand, the interest of the life holder is of more per-
manent character, and accordingly more likely to mislead the
innocent purchaser. While the evidence of a bailment may be
readily obtainable because recent, the facts of the creation of
a life interest may have arisen so long before as to have passed
out of the minds of all but the life owner himself.
Hence, this proposition may be suggested. It is open to the
courts to hold as follows: If chattels are given to A for life,
or are given to A, his executors, administrators, and assigns,
followed by a gift over on some contingency, A has the power to
destroy the future interest by a, sale to a bonow fide purchu-ser.
It is not asserted that this is the law, but that it is in accordance
with present tendencies, and that the existing precedents do not
preclude such a decision.
Why, it may be asked, are there no recent cases directly in
point? The answer would seem to be: because people do not
as a rule create such future interests without the intervention
of a trust. If a trust intervened, on well known principles, the
future interest would be destroyed on a transfer by the trustee
to a bona fide purchaser. The proposition contended for amounts
to little more than this: the courts should do what the creator
of the interest would himself have done if he had been a careful
draughtsman and had conformed to modern practices.
97 WLsLTON, SALS (2d ed. 1924) §§ 423, 325. Cases on rights of a
bailor to recover a chattel from a bona fide purchaser from a bailee are
collected in 6 C. J. 1147, n. 25.
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So far we have considered questions on which the modern
authorities are few or entirely lacking. Aside from a few points
on the matter of future privileges of enjoyment, the law of
future interests in chattels personal and in land can neither
be said to be in agreement nor in direct conflict; the authorities
to a large extent simply do not make common ground. An ex-
amination of the modern cases on future interests in personalty
disclose that most of the cases concern three subjects: the dis-
tribution of corporate dividends, income, and other similar
rights and privileges between life tenant and remainderman;
the duty of the life tenant to give security on suit of the owner
of the future interest; and the question of whether the future
interest is vested or contingent. The first two are utterly un-
related to the law of estates and future interests in land. The
third, which really includes a number of distinct classes of prob-
lems, comes close enough to the feudal law of estates in a few
particulars to make comparison worth while. To deal ade-
quately with the law of vested and contingent future interests
in personalty would require a separate article. Nothing of the
sort is attempted here. But in so far as that law may throw
light on the applicability of the land law, we should make some
reference to it.
In the land law, the term "vested" seems to have referred or-
iginally to investiture with a portion of the seisin.98 Obviously
any holder of a present freehold interest came within the
designation "vested," as did also a remainderman, if there was no
condition precedent to his interest taking effect in possession
other than the termination of the preceding estates of freehold.
A reversion was also regarded as vested. Long before seisin
ceased to be a vital concept in land law the reversioner and re-
mainderman ceased to be thought of primarily with reference to
the seisin, but the distinction between vested and contingent in-
terests survived. Today, the terms vested and contingent are con-
stantly applied to future interests in personalty as well as
realty. But to get at the real problem involved in cases using
these terms, we must ask: what difference in legal consequences
will it make whether the interest is vested or contingent? Some-
times the problem is merely the question: is there a condition
precedent to the interest taking effect or not? Often a partic-
ular form of this question is: can we imply a condition pre-
cedent that the holder of the interest must survive the period
of distribution? This question originally arose only in con-
nection with personalty, and indeed has been said to involve
a different meaning of the term vested from that used in the
9s HAWKINS, WILLs (2d ed. 1912) 265. But cf. K.ALES, FUTURE INTERESTS
(2d ed. 1920) § 30.
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land law; " but it is clear, today, that the same inquiry is made
as to interests in land,10 though it may be that the implication
of such a condition precedent is less strong in the land law.
Again, the distinction between vested and contingent future
interests may raise the question of validity under the rule
against perpetuities. It may raise the question of the rate of
taxation under a taxation statute drawing a distinction between
vested and contingent interests. It may raise a question of the
acceleration of a future interest on the failure of the preceding
one. Sometimes, the question whether an interest is vested or
contingent involves an inquiry into its alienability, although to-
day in most jurisdictions some kinds of contingent interests
both in land and in personalty are alienable. In the land law
it might, if remainders were involved, raise a question of
destructibility. But as we have seen, the doctrine of destruct-
ibility of contingent remainders by merger or forfeiture would
seem to be inapplicable to personalty. The terms "vested" and
"contingent," then, are significant today primarily as designa-
tions of one or more of the legal consequences herein described.
What operative facts give rise to vested or contingent future
iinterests? Obviously, no single answer can be given to this
question. The decisions are almost innumerable on the question
of what words are construed as conditions precedent and what
as conditions subsequent. But that has little to do with the
theory of estates. The important doctrine derived from the
land law is that a future interest is vested if there is no condi-
tion precedent to its taking effect in possession other than the
termination of the preceding vested estates of freehold. Does
this doctrine apply to future interests in personalty? Or are
all future interests in personalty contingent because there is a
condition precedent to their taking effect in possession, to-wit:
the termination of preceding present interests? In answering
this question, we must look askance at those cases where the
issue was: must the legatee survive the period of distribution.
For the courts often say the interest is vested, when they merely
mean that there is no implied condition precedent that the
legatee survive the period of distribution, or as some have said,
that the future interest is transmissible. Without doubt, if
99 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 118; KALES, op. cit. upra note 98, § 495.
10o Examples of testamentary dispositions of a mixed residue of realty
and personalty where the question was whether the legatee or devisee must
survive the period of distribution are found in Bland v. Davisson, 77 W.
Va. 557, 88 S. E. 1021 (1916) ; Petition of Norris, 46 R. I. 57, 125 Ati. 34
(1924) ; Thompson v. Adams, 205 Ill. 552, 69 N. E. 1 (1903).
See also, as to the applicability of the "divide and pay over" rule to
realty as well as personalty, Gluck, The "Diide and Pay Over" Rzde in
New York (1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 8.
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the precedent interest were a bailment for a term or at will,
the bailor's interest would be regarded as vested, for the reason
that the court would look at the bailor's interest as a present
one. But if the precedent interest is for life, then we have a
test as to the applicability of the doctrine from the law of
estates. In England the courts have wavered. Evans v.
Walker, 2 a case involving the applicability of the rule against
perpetuities, held that a future interest in a chattel following
a life estate could be vested. To the same effect is Samuda's
Trust,102 but in that case, though the court assumed that a fu-
ture interest in chattels following a life interest could be vested
for purposes of the rule against perpetuities, in fact the interest
in question was held to be contingent. In the case of In re
Backhouse,03 however, the opposite view was taken. Two cases
which involved the question of vesting for purposes of the ap-
plicability of a bill of sale registration act took the view that
a future interest following a life interest in a chattel is neces-
sarily contingent.10 4
In the United States, such authority as there is accords with
Evans v. Walker.0 5 If we add to these decisions the large num-
ber of American cases in which it is assumed that a future inter-
est following a life interest in a chattel could be vested,10 we
may fairly conclude that to this extent the doctrine of the land
law as to vested future interests has been taken over into the
realm of personalty. That is to say, a future interest in a chat-
tel will as a rule be regarded as vested if there is no other con-
dition precedent to its taking effect in possession or enjoyment
than the termination of one or more vested life interests. This
rule would seem to apply whether the interests be legal or
equitable.
Suppose land is devised "to A in fee twenty years after my
death." The usual explanation of such a testamentary disposi-
tion is that A has an executory limitation which does not vest
1 3 Ch. D. 211 (1876).
1- [1924] 1 Ch. 61.
203 [1921] 2 Ch. 51.
104 In re Tritton, 61 L. T. 301 (1889); In re Thynne, [1911] 1 Ch. 282.
10 Supra note 101. Seaver v. Fitzgerald, 141 Mass. 401, 6 N. E. 73
(1886); McAllister v. Elliot, 83 N. H. 225, 140 Atl. 708 (1928); In re
Gageby's Estate, 293 Pa. 109, 141 Atl. 842 (1928); cf. Salisbury v. Salis-
bury, 92 Kan. 644, 141 Pac. 173 (1914).
106 In the following cases and doubtless in many others this assumption
is made: Nicol v. Morton, 332 Ill. 538, 164 N. E. 5 (1928); In re Wash-
burn's Estate, supra note 58; Boal v. Metropolitan Art Museum, supra
note 41; Voorhees v. Singer, 73 N. J. Eq. 532, 68 Atl. 217 (1907); Bank
of Statesboro v. Futch, 164 Ga. 181, 138 S. E. 60 (1927); Min Young v.
Min Young, supra note 36.
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until twenty years after the testator's death.'' If, however, a
bequest of personalty were made "to A twenty years after my
death," it is quite possible that a court would hold it vested on
the death of the testator. This would certainly seem to be true
if the language were "to A to be paid twenty years after my
death." 2o8 To be sure, the cases in support of this proposition
generally raise merely the question whether the legatee must
survive the period of distribution, but such a limitation has been
held to be vested for purposes of the rule against perpetuities.119
The reason for this distinction between realty and personalty,
if such there be, is presumably due to doctrines about seisin
which have no application to chattels.
Before concluding, attention should be called to the fact that
in a number of states are found statutes making certain rules
of real property law applicable to personalty. The New York
statute, is as follows:
"The absolute ownership of personal property shall not be
suspended by any limitation or condition, for a longer period
than during the continuance and until the termination of not
more than two lives in being at the date of the instrument con-
taining such limitation or condition; or, if such instrument be
a last will and testament, for not more than two lives in being
at the death of the testator. In other respects limitations of
future or contingent interests in personal property, are subject
to the rules prescribed in relation to future estates in real
property." 110
It is to be noted that this last clause does not say all rules in
relation to future interests in realty are applicable. Indeed, the
New York courts have recognized that they are not always ap-
plicable, though in many cases this statute has been cited to
justify the application to personalty of a rule respecting the
land law.11 While an analysis of these cases is not attempted in
this connection, it may be doubted whether the existence of the
statutes in question materially modify the conclusions reached
herein. Other states are more cautious in respect to statutes on
future interests in personalty and the applicability of the land
law. The Montana Code provides:
107 See Butler's note to FEARNE, op. cit. supra note 64, at 1, note a; GnAY,
op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 793-797; Freund, Three Suggestions Conccining
Future Interests (1920) 33 HARV. L. REV. 526, 536.
10 8 See 3 WARNER., ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1923) § 436.
109 Nicol v. Morton, 332 Ill. 533, 164 N. E. 5 (1928); O'Hare v. Johnston,
273 Ill. 458, 113 N. E. 127 (1916); Shepard v. Union & New Haven Trust
Co., 106 Conn. 627, 138 Atl. 809 (1927).
11o N. Y. PERSONAL PROPRT LAw (1917) c. 45, § 11. For a similar
statute, see Wis. STAT. (1927) § 230.14.
131 See the discussion in CHAPLIN, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENA-
TioN (3d ed. 1928) §§ 458-462.
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"The names and classification of interests in real property
have only such application to interests in personal property as
is in this division of the code expressly provided." 112
The Codes of North and South Dakota and California contain
substantially the same provision.1s Clearly, these statutes do
not make the law of estates in land applicable to future interests
in personalty. !
In Georgia a statute provides that "any estate may be created
in the latter [personalty] that can be created in the former
[realty] .... 11 This hardly means more than that the same
extent of privilege of enjoyment may be created in personalty
as in realty. As estates tail are abolished by statute in
Georgia, x r, it would seem that this piece of legislation goes no
farther than judicial decision has gone in this respect.
By way of conclusion, the following observations are believed
to be substantiated 'by the discussion which has preceded: We
cannot infer that, because a rule is applicable to future interests
in land, it applies to future interests in personalty; sometimes
the courts have applied these rules, sometimes they have not;
more often there are no cases in which the application has been
attempted. In any event, the question should not be one of
taking over a feudal concept, but of deciding a concrete problem;
we should not ask, is it an executory limitation, a remainder or
a reversion, but, is it void under the rule against perpetuities,
or should the donor rather than the donee take on the termina-
tion of the present interest? It would be most unfortunate if
the law of personalty were saddled with the incubus of the all
but obsolete feudal land law; and it is believed that the courts
have not required this, and will not do so. It is also believed
that the American courts in most states are open to decide that
a future interest following a gift for life or to one, his execu-
tors, administrators, and assigns, can be extinguished by a
transfer by the holder of the present interest to a bona fide
purchaser. On the other hand, though we should avoid taking
over the feudal law of estates, we may well treat land and per-
sonalty alike in many situations; but whether we do or not,
should be a question of policy. Lastly, to argue that there are or
are not estates and future interests in personalty is meaningless.
We know that there may be privileges of enjoyment with a life
quantum, and future privileges of enjoyment to take effect after
a life interest; we also know that the legal consequences incident
112 MONT. REv. CODES (Choate, 1921) § 6698. See also § 6718.
113N. D. Comp. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 5280; S. D. Ruv. CODE (1919)
§ 287; CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 702.
114 GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 3656.
115 Ibid. § 3661.
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to these interests are not the same as the legal consequences
incident to analogous privileges of enjoyment in land. When
a new question arises in the law of future interests in chattels
it should be decided on its merits, and not on the basis of the
feudal concepts.
